The present experiment investigated pigeons' and humans' processing styles-local or global-in an exemplar-based visual categorization task in which category membership of every stimulus had to be learned individually, and in a rule-based task in which category membership was defined by a perceptual rule. Group Intact was trained with the original pictures (providing both intact local and global information), Group Scrambled was trained with scrambled versions of the same pictures (impairing global information), and Group Blurred was trained with blurred versions (impairing local information).
The question of whether humans and animals perceive objects as integrated wholes or rather as collections of independent component parts is a longstanding issue in comparative visual cognition. It has been suggested that the human visual system tends to prioritize more highly the global level of processing (e.g., Navon, 1977; Parron & Fagot, 2007) , whereas experiments with baboons and chimpanzees yielded either no reliable difference between processing levels, or a local advantage (e.g., Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999; Parron & Fagot, 2007) . A strong local bias was also found in capuchins (e.g., Spinozzi et al., 2003 Spinozzi et al., , 2006 . Among birds, particularly pigeons have acquired a reputation of focusing on local rather than on global features. Since Cerella demonstrated that pigeons attended to local details of line drawings while overall configuration was obviously neglected, it has become a commonly accepted assumption that stimulus elements are crucial for pigeons' visual control, whereas their spatial arrangement is unimportant (Cerella, 1977 (Cerella, , 1979 (Cerella, , 1982 (Cerella, , 1986 (Cerella, , 1990 . This local bias has become known as "local precedence effect" (e.g., Cook, 1992a; Cook, Riley, & Brown, 1992; Cavoto & Cook, 2001; Gibson, Wasserman, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005; Troje & Aust, 2013) , in contrast to the "global precedence effect" often shown by humans (e.g., Navon, 1977; Parron & Fagot, 2007) . However, solid evidence has emerged that such a strict dichotomy may not be justified. Demonstration of a local or a global advantage in a species neither means that such an effect will occur in every task and with every experimental set-up, nor that local or global processing will necessarily be exhibited to the exclusion of the other. Indeed, it has been shown that in humans (e.g., Kinchla, Solis-Macias, & Hoffman, 1983; Pomerantz, 1983; Ward, 1982) as well as in pigeons (e.g., Aust & Huber, 2001 Cook, 1992a Cook, , 1992b Cook, , 1993 Cook, Cavoto, & Cavoto, 1996; Fremouw, Herbranson, & Shimp, 1998 Goto, Wills, & Lea, 2004; KirkpatrickSteger & Wasserman, 1996; Lazareva, Vecera, & Wasserman, 2006; Lazareva, Freiburger, & Wasserman, 2006; Matsukawa, Inoue, & Jitsumori, 2004; Shimp, Herbranson, Fremouw, & Froehlich, 2006; Wasserman et al., 1996; Wasserman, Kirkpatrick-Steger, Van Hamme, & Biederman, 1993; Watanabe, 2001; Watanabe & Ito, 1990 ; see also Van Hamme, Wasserman, & Biederman, 1992) either local or global information (or both) can exert discriminative control over performance and that attention can be flexibly shifted between parts and wholes. In an experiment that investigated pigeons' preferred processing style in the context of biological motion we found that, despite an overall local precedence, the birds probably disposed of the ability to use global structure, but "chose" to not use it (Troje & Aust, 2013) .
A number of studies have used scrambled and/or blurred stimuli to investigate the relative roles of local and global information. The idea is that blurring will destroy the fine details of an image and thus impair local processing. In turn, scrambling will destroy configural information and thus impair global processing. Such a technique was, for example, applied by Collishaw (2002a, 2002b) who showed that humans could recognize pictures of learned faces when they were either scrambled into constituent parts or when they were blurred, indicating a role of both featural and configural information for human face recognition. Also, they investigated in a repetition priming paradigm whether or not featural and configural processing provide independent routes of recognition. Priming was found for scrambled to blurred faces and vice versa, which led the authors to suggest an integrative model of face recognition. This assumes that local and global information are extracted separately, but that the outputs of featural and configural representations eventually converge to the same face identification units.
Also in pigeons, studies using scrambled and/or blurred stimuli have, for the most part, pointed to the dual importance of local and global information (e.g., Matsukawa et al., 2004; Watanabe & Ito, 1990) . Presenting color photographs with and without humans, Huber (2001, 2003) showed that picture scrambling did not completely disrupt discrimination, though it resulted in performance decrements. In Huber, Troje, Loidolt, Aust, and Grass (2000) we first trained pigeons to discriminate between pictures of male and female faces and then tested them for transfer to various types of transformations and reduction of the feature content of the pictures. In two filter tests we examined the effects of blurring and creating block images. The finding that neither manipulation substantially affected performance pointed to the robustness of pigeons' classification behavior against losses in either local or global features and was thus evidence for the flexible use of both sources of information.
Which level will actually come to control pigeons' responding in a specific task seems to depend on a number of factors, including, for example, properties of the avian visual system, attentional factors, and stimulus factors such as feature salience, configural organization, and viewing distance (Cook, 2001 ; see also Goto et al., 2004; Pomerantz, 1983; Watanabe, 2011) . Another factor that may possibly play a role but has, so far, not been studied in the context of local and global processing, is category structure: A distinction has to be made between categories that can be mastered only by associating every single instance with the category to which it belongs (i.e., by rote learning)-the categorization mechanism put forward by exemplar models-and categories that are mastered by condensing experience with individual stimuli into a derived abstraction of the category-specific features they share. Recognition of familiar and classification of novel category members is thus mediated by a perceptually based response rule in the latter case. This response rule may entail either the abstraction of some category-specific features that define the "target," as purported by feature models of categorization, or the abstraction of a summary representation of a category that corresponds to the average, or central tendency, of all of the exemplars that have been experienced, as put forward by prototype models (see, e.g., Huber & Aust, 2006 , for details on the different models of categorization and their relation to exemplar and rule learning).
We will in the following refer to the first type of categories as exemplar-based, and to the second one as rule-based. Because a subject has to remember only a set of some (few) features or even just one summary representation instead of every single category instance, rule-based learning is more economical than exemplarbased learning in terms of the number of associations that have to be formed and thus the required storage capacities. Also, it allows for transfer to novel category instances, but with the possible cost that information about individual stimuli is lost. Cook and Smith (2006) argued that organisms may bear the costs of having both processes because of the different advantages provided by each. Indeed, there is strong evidence for both exemplar-and rule-based learning in human categorization (e.g., Blair & Homa, 2001; Cook & Smith, 2006; Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 1981; Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981; Minda & Smith, 2001; Smith & Minda, 1998) , and also regarding pigeons, the literature is replete with demonstrations of their ability to deal with tasks requiring either rote learning (e.g., Chase & Heinemann, 2001; Cook & Fagot, 2009; Cook, Levison, & Gillett, 2005; Fagot & Cook, 2006; Vaughan & Greene, 1984; von Fersen & Delius, 1989) or the abstraction of a perceptual rule (for reviews see Huber, 2000; Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002; Zentall, Wasserman, Lazareva, Thompson, & Ratterman, 2008) . Both species' categorization competence thus contains both exemplar learning and rule abstraction, but the balance of the two is not well understood yet and seems to shift on the basis of category size, category structure, and stage of learning (Cook & Smith, 2006) . Smith and Minda (1998) provided evidence that human category learning passes through an early abstraction-based stage, followed by a later exemplar-based stage. Cook and Smith (2006) confirmed this finding and could show that it also applies to pigeons. Their results suggested that pigeons, just like humans, have a default abstractive stance, with the memorization of individual exemplars being secondary and deployed only at a later stage, for example, for dealing with exceptions and atypical instances.
There is thus evidence that pigeons (a) can flexibly shift attention between local and global features and that they (b) can deal with both exemplar-and rule-based tasks. What we are still missing, however, is an integration of these two aspects of pigeon visual categorization. Furthermore, there are hardly any studies that directly compared pigeons' performance in a local/global experiment with that of humans (or any other species), meaning that they were subjected to the same task and tested with widely identical methods. However, such comparisons would certainly be of value as they could shed light on possible interspecies differences in preferred processing style (local or global) and the influence that the type of the task to be mastered (exemplar-based or rule-based) may have on the way in which visual information is processed. The present study investigated, for the first time, the interplay between processing level and category structure in both pigeons and humans. In particular, two goals were pursued: It was investigated (a) whether, all other experimental conditions being This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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almost equal, the type of the presented visual category (exemplaror rule-based) would promote the use of a particular processing style (local or global), and (b) whether transfer of information between processing levels would be possible and to what extent this ability may depend on the category type. Transfer between the local and the global level has already been shown for humans (Schwaninger et al., 2002a) , however, with just one particular testing paradigm (priming) and for just one particular type of stimuli (human faces). Regarding pigeons, respective evidence is completely missing. Here, we wanted to find out whether such transfer would occur-in both species-also in a different testing paradigm (a two-alternatives forced-choice procedure; 2AFC) and with visual categories other than human faces. Pigeons and humans were confronted with the same exemplarand rule-based tasks. The pictures assigned to the positive and the negative class in the exemplar-based task were perceptually random. By contrast, all positive pictures in the rule-based task showed one or more trees, whereas no tree was depicted in any of the negative stimuli. Each subject was trained in one of three presentation modes, this is, with intact pictures (providing both intact local and global information), with scrambled pictures (retaining local and degrading global information), or with blurred pictures (retaining global and degrading local information). Comparison of acquisition performance in the three groups of both species should allow for conclusions regarding the relative roles of local and global processing in each type of task. After training the subjects were tested for transfer to the other two (i.e., previously untrained) presentation modes (Test 1) to see whether, to what extent, and in which "direction(s)" transfer of information between the local and the global level would be possible.
Thereafter, some additional tests were carried out to obtain further insight into the nature of pigeons' and humans' processing styles and categorization strategies. The importance of color information was assessed by showing grayscale versions of the training pictures in all three presentation modes (Test 2). Indeed, there is ample evidence for the importance of color as a discriminative cue in pigeons (e.g., Aust & Huber, 2001 , 2010 Aust & Steurer, 2013; Huber et al., 2000; Loidolt, Aust, Meran, & Huber, 2003; Kirsch, Kabanova, & Güntürkün, 2008; Troje, Huber, Loidolt, Aust, & Fieder, 1999; Wills et al., 2009) . Color may contribute to structuring a picture by setting boundaries and may thereby facilitate singling out the target in a rule-based task (see Jacobs, 1993; Mollon, 1989; Wurm, Legge, Isenberg, & Luebker, 1993) and recognition of item-specific properties (like characteristic objects or shapes) in an exemplar-based task. Alternatively (or in addition), a subject may exploit color cues that are typically present in members of a certain rule-based category and identify members of exemplar-based categories by means of characteristic item-specific individual colors or color compositions.
The effects of both manipulations (blurring and scrambling) being applied at the same time were investigated by showing stimuli that had first been blurred and then scrambled (Test 3). A generalization test with novel positive and negative instances of the rule-based task in the three different presentation modes further explored the nature, extent, and limits of the perceptual rule that was presumably abstracted (Test 4).
Specifically, the present experiment was aimed at investigating the following hypotheses and predictions:
1. As rule-based learning requires the formation of fewer associations we expected the rule-based task to be acquired faster than the exemplar-based task. Nevertheless, the possibility could not be completely excluded that the subjects would learn also the rulebased task by associating every single instance with the category to which it belonged. And if, for some reason, the stimuli of the rule-based task were easier for them to remember than those of the exemplar-based task, faster learning would occur in the rule-based task, however, not because of a rule being abstracted. But if so, the subjects should fail in Test 4 where they were presented with novel tree and nontree pictures. Thus, Test 4 should reveal whether they indeed learned the task by abstracting a perceptual rule. Furthermore, that test was expected to provide insight into the extent to which the category rule (if acquired) could be generalized to novel instances across presentation modes.
2. Although there is evidence that both pigeons and humans are able to use local as well as global information, it seems that, nevertheless, pigeons often tend to preferably use local information whereas humans usually seem to focus on more global features in the first place. If, indeed, our pigeons approached the present tasks with a local bias Groups Intact and Scrambled should learn faster than Group Blurred. In humans, by contrast, acquisition should be easier in Groups Intact and Blurred than in Group Scrambled in case of a global bias.
3. These biases may, however, be modified by category structure. The hypothesis to be investigated was that global processing should be advantageous in a task that requires the detection of a target figure (rule-based), whereas the need to distinguish among individual stimuli should direct attention rather toward some salient stimulus-specific detail(s) and thus favor local processing. Should rule-based categories indeed promote global processing and exemplar-based categories local processing, the differences in acquisition speed between the three groups (see 2) should, for pigeons, be less pronounced in the rule-based than in the exemplarbased task, and, for humans, less pronounced in the exemplarbased than in the rule-based task. But should our second hypothesis (2) be wrong, meaning that both processing styles were a priori equally favored (by one or both species), we would predict for (3) that the subjects should mainly or exclusively focus on local information in the exemplar-based task and on global information in the rule-based task. This would manifest in Group Blurred (impaired local information) learning more slowly than the other two groups in the exemplar-based task, whereas in the rule-based task Group Scrambled (impaired global information) should be at a disadvantage.
4. If the findings by Schwaninger et al. (2002a) that humans can bidirectionally transfer information between the local and the global level are valid not only in priming paradigms and are not restricted to the very specific stimulus class of human faces, the human participants in the present experiment should be able to generalize from either training mode (intact, scrambled, blurred) to all others in Test 1. The same holds for the pigeons, should they be able to transfer information between the local and the global level just like humans. By contrast, failure (by either species) to generalize to any untrained presentation mode or selective failure to show generalization between any two specific modes would allow for further conclusions regarding the subjects' preferred processing styles and the nature and extent of possible limitations in their ability to transfer information between the local and the global This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
level. For example, a focus on local features during training may lead to good transfer between intact and scrambled stimuli (both contain intact local information) in Test 1 whereas transfer from intact or scrambled stimuli to blurred ones (contain degraded local information) may be impaired or even absent. In turn, a focus on global features may be reflected by good transfer between intact and blurred stimuli (both contain intact global information) whereas transfer to scrambled stimuli (contain degraded global information) may be impaired or absent. 5. Color may assist recognition and categorization at the local level (i.e., colors in a particular region of a picture, like the color of an object or object part) or at the global level (i.e., the specific spectrum of colors in a stimulus), or at both levels. The presentation of grayscale versions of all three stimulus types (intact, scrambled, blurred) in Test 2 should provide some insight into the nature of this balance. Furthermore, the loss of color may affect exemplar-and rule-based tasks to different extents. We hypothesized that color should play a more important role in the exemplarthan in the rule-based task as interstimulus similarities concerning coloration were (at least to the human eye) stronger in the latter. Whereas greenish, brownish, and bluish colors prevailed in both the tree and the nontree pictures-and therefore did probably not make good class predictors-every stimulus in the exemplarbased task had its own, characteristic color composition, which could thus have made color a highly salient and reliable cue in the recognition of individual stimuli.
6. Presenting the subjects with pictures that were both blurred and scrambled in Test 3 was expected to show whether the deteriorating effects of degrading both local and global information would add up and the results of this test should assist in further judging the relative importance of the two processing modes. Failure to recognize the test stimuli would confirm the general effectiveness of the two manipulations in removing all relevant local and global information. In turn, residual discrimination would be an indicator of the extent to which remnants of local and/or global information that were still present in the pictures could be used (such as tiny local features or overall color or brightness cues).
Method Subjects
Experimental subjects were 18 pigeons (Columba livia) and an equal number of humans (Homo sapiens sapiens). Fourteen pigeons were homing pigeons, four were of a local Austrian breed ("Strasser"). The birds were group housed in outdoor aviary compartments in an inner court of the Biocenter of the University of Vienna. Food was administered only during the experimental sessions and on weekends. Water and grit were freely available in the aviaries at any time. The birds were kept at about 90% of their free feeding weights. The human participants were under-and postgraduate students and members of the nonscientific staff of the Department of Cognitive Biology at the University of Vienna. They were 8 men and 10 women and were between 18 and 45 years of age (mean: 28.8).
Apparatus
The pigeons were trained in six identical modified Skinner boxes. All birds were used to working in any of these boxes and were arbitrarily trained in any of them each day, depending on the immediate availability of the individual boxes (which were all run in parallel). Each Skinner box was connected to a PC equipped with electronics for running the presentation program and controlling the feeder. Data acquisition and device control were handled by means of a special software package (CognitionLab, M. M. Steurer). Stimuli were presented on a 15== XGA Color TFT-LCD monitor (resolution 1024 ϫ 768 px). It was mounted behind an infrared touch frame (model D87587-001, by ELO, Menlo Park, CA) and constituted the frontal wall of each box. Reward was administered by an automated feeding device that lifted a piston with a depression on top through a food reservoir. Through a hole in the bottom of the box grain trapped in the depression was made accessible to the pigeons for a prespecified time period after a correct response. During the feeding interval, the top of the piston was illuminated by a white LED. The birds' activities inside the box could be observed on a control monitor. For further technical details see Steurer, Aust, and Huber (2012) . The apparatus for the human participants consisted only of a computer and a monitor, which could be operated with a computer mouse.
Stimuli and Procedure
All subjects were trained in a two-alternatives forced-choice procedure (2AFC), which was basically the same for both species, with only some parameter settings and session lengths being modified for humans to condense the experiment. As humans did all tasks in one go, it appeared reasonable to keep the individual experimental phases as short as possible in order to avoid loss of concentration and interest. For both pigeons and humans, each trial (both training and test trials) involved the simultaneous presentation of one positive (Sϩ) and one negative (SϪ) stimulus on a black background, with one stimulus appearing somewhat left of the middle of the screen and the other stimulus appearing somewhat right. The positions (left/right) of the S ϩ and the SϪ varied randomly from trial to trial. The subjects had to decide on one of them, whereupon they were given feedback on the accuracy of their choice: Correct and incorrect choices were accompanied by different acoustic signals (Sϩ: 600 Hz for 50 msec; SϪ: 200 Hz for 50 msec). These tones were the only feedback for humans on positive trials, whereas pigeons received the tones just as secondary reinforcers in addition to food reward: The feeding interval was set to 3 sec; thereafter, the piston moved back into its "waiting position" where it could no longer be reached by the birds. Incorrect responses were, for both species, always followed by a correction trial, meaning that stimulus presentation was terminated and the color of the screen turned red for a short period of time (pigeons: 3 sec; humans: 1 sec). Then the stimuli of the previous trial were shown again in identical positions as before. Another wrong choice led to another correction trial, whereas a correct choice terminated the trial and led, for the pigeons, to food access.
For the pigeons, each trial was preceded by an intertrial interval (ITI) of 4 sec, during which an empty (black) screen was shown. No ITIs were administered in the experiment with humans. Pigeons indicated their choice by directly pecking at a stimulus, whereas humans navigated the mouse cursor onto one of the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
stimuli and clicked it. 1 The pigeons were familiar with the experimental set-up and the basic procedure at the onset of training, as they had already participated in unrelated visual categorization experiments before. The human subjects received a brief verbal instruction prior to the experiment. They were informed about the basic logic of the procedure, however, not about the specifics of the tasks they would be confronted with. In order to prevent behavioral cueing, the experimenter was either sitting behind the participant during testing or (during longer sessions) even left the room. Humans did the entire experiment within about 30 to 60 min, depending on individual learning progress. The pigeons were trained in varying numbers of daily sessions (except weekends), depending on their levels of motivation.
The stimuli were retrieved from royalty-free online resources and were adapted in Photoshop CS2. They were presented at a size of 112 ϫ 112 px (resolution: 96 dpi), resulting in a size of 2.4 ϫ 2.4 cm on the screen. The pictures that were used for the exemplarbased task were perceptually random and showed, for example, comic figures, pieces of art, computer graphics, or color and texture patterns. They were neither chosen nor assigned to the positive or the negative class according to any particular criterion. The pictures presented in the rule-based task were photographs of natural scenes, characterized by the presence (Sϩ) or the absence (SϪ) of a target, this is, one or more trees. Stimulus examples are shown in Figure 1 .
Training. Each task-the exemplar and the rule-based onerequired the subjects to discriminate between 20 Sϩ and 20 SϪ stimuli. All subjects were trained on both tasks with their order being counterbalanced. This is, half of the subjects of each species (i.e., nine pigeons and nine humans) were presented with the exemplar-based task first, which required them to discriminate between the 20 Sϩ and the 20 SϪ stimuli with arbitrary class assignment of the individual instances. The remaining subjects were trained on the rule-based task first, which required them to discriminate between 20 tree (Sϩ) and 20 nontree (SϪ) pictures. In each task one third of the subjects (i.e., three of each species) were trained with intact stimuli (Group Intact). This means that the stimuli provided full local and global information, and either type of information (or both) could be used to solve the discrimination. One third were trained with scrambled versions of the same stimuli (Group Scrambled). These were generated by digitally cutting the intact pictures into 16 squares (14 ϫ 14 px each) and randomly reassembling them. As a consequence, overall stimulus configuration was destroyed while fine details remained intact. Thereby, the subjects were supposed to be pushed toward using local rather than global information to solve the task. The remaining three subjects of each species were trained with stimulus versions in which local information was degraded by applying to the pictures a Gaussian filter (radius 5 px), while overall configuration was retained (Group Blurred). Thereby, they were supposed to be pushed toward using global rather than local information. Examples of stimuli of the three types (intact, scrambled, blurred) are shown in the first three rows of Figure 1 .
In each training session, all 40 stimuli were shown. Thus, a session consisted of 20 trials, with each involving the simultaneous presentation of 1 Sϩ and 1 SϪ. Sϩ/SϪ pairings varied randomly from session to session. When the subjects had acquired the first task (see Data analysis) and had done all associated tests, they were transferred to the other task (exemplar-or rule-based, respectively).
Tests. In all tests that followed the training phase of each task test trials were inserted into training sequences in a randomized fashion, avoiding, however, the first trial, and with at least one training trial appearing between two test trials. The latter restriction was not applied in tests with humans though, to keep sessions as short as possible. The number of test stimuli shown in each test varied depending on its logic and design (Test 1: 80; Test 2: 120; Test 3: 40; Test 4: 120; for details see test descriptions below). Responses to test stimuli were reinforced like in training trials, that is, they resulted in food reward (for pigeons) or correction trials and were accompanied by the same acoustic signals as in training trials. This was done to prevent the subjects from coming to recognize test stimuli as such just by their appearance, which deviated from that of training stimuli and which may have caused pigeons, in particular, to choose arbitrarily in such trials if choice of neither stimulus was rewarded. Each test stimulus was presented only once in order to avoid one-trial learning.
Test 1: Transfer to other presentation modes. This test investigated the extent to which transfer between processing modes was possible. The subjects were confronted with the same 40 pictures as during training, presented, however, in the two other (previously untrained) modes. This means that Group Intact was shown the scrambled and the blurred versions of their training stimuli, Group Scrambled was shown intact and blurred stimuli, and Group Blurred was shown intact and scrambled stimuli. Thus, each subject was presented with a total of 80 test stimuli (20 S ϩ and 20 SϪ in each of the two test modes, resulting in 40 test trials). For the pigeons, two training trials (i.e., four pictures) were replaced with test versions of these stimuli in every session, meaning that both test versions of each (replaced) training stimulus were shown within the same session. Individual test sessions thus consisted of 22 trials (18 training trials and four test trials), and the whole test comprised a total of 10 sessions. For the human participants, the test was collapsed into one single session that consisted of 100 trials (60 training trials and 40 test trials). For both species, the order of the modes in which test stimuli were presented varied across pictures.
Test 2: Transfer to grayscale stimuli. Subjects were presented with grayscale versions of the intact (int_g), scrambled (scr_g), and blurred (blur_g) training stimuli. Thus, three test stimuli (1 int_g, 1 scr_g, and 1 blur_g) were derived from each of the 20 Sϩ and the 20 SϪ training stimuli, resulting in a total of 120 test stimuli (i.e., 60 test trials). For the pigeons, two training trials per session (i.e., four stimuli) were replaced with three test trials, each of which showed one of the three grayscale versions of the respective stimuli. Thus, each test session consisted of 24 trials (18 training trials and 6 test trials), and the whole test comprised a total of 10 sessions. For the human participants, the test was 1 Critics may object that the small size of the cursor could have tuned humans' attention toward local processing. However, it should be noted that having to hit the stimulus with the tiny tip of their beaks could have had a similar effect in pigeons and, what is more, a "choice" did not require the subjects (neither humans nor pigeons) to hit a stimulus at any particular position. Thus, neither responding method (clicking or pecking) should have particularly promoted local at the expense of global processing (or, at least, they should not have done so to different extents). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
collapsed into one single session of 120 trials (60 training trials and 60 test trials). Again, the order of the modes in which test stimuli were presented varied across pictures for both species. Test 4: Transfer to novel stimuli. This test was conducted in the rule-based task only. Subjects of all three groups were presented with 20 novel tree and 20 novel nontree stimuli, each of which was shown in all three modes-intact, scrambled and blurred (int_n, scr_n, blur_n). Thus, there were 120 test stimuli in total (i.e., 60 test trials). Unlike in the previous tests, no training stimuli were replaced because test stimuli were not derived from training stimuli. Instead, six test trials per session were added to the 20 training trials for the pigeons, which resulted in 26 trials per session and the whole test consisting of 10 sessions. In each session, all three versions (int_n, scr_n, blur_n) of four novel stimuli (2 Sϩ, 2 S-) were shown. Human participants were presented with one single test session that consisted of 120 trials (60 training trials and 60 test trials). The order of the modes in which stimuli were presented was varied across pictures for both species.
Data Analysis
Training performance was analyzed on the basis of correct first choices (i.e., correction trials were excluded from analysis) and was assessed by means of significance in a binomial test (␣ ϭ .05). Because we used a discrete statistic no number of correct first choices existed that exactly matched the limit of significance. As a consequence, the minimum number of correct first choices to indicate significance corresponded to a p value lower than 0.05. Namely, Ն 15 correct first choices of 20 (p ϭ .021) had to be obtained. The criterion of mastery for the training was defined as significant performance in eight of 10 successive sessions.
Test performances of the individual subjects were analyzed by calculating correct first choices over all test trials of the same type and assessing significance in the binomial test. As all different types of test stimuli were analyzed separately (even when they appeared within the same test, like the two novel presentation modes in Test 1), the number of trials entering an analysis was always 20. Thus, the same significance criterion as during training applied for the assessment of test performances, with significant discrimination of the test stimuli of a particular type always requiring Ն15 correct first choices (p ϭ .021).
For making statistical statements at group level we applied Fisher's (1954) method of combining individual probabilities (Sokal & Rohlf, 1995 ; see also Aust & Steurer, 2013; Huber, Apfalter, Steurer, & Prossinger, 2005) , which is based on each p value being transformed into a 2 value. The advantage of this analysis method is that, unlike p values, 2 values can be added and thus allow for deriving assessments of group performances directly from individual significances. Adding the 2 values obtained for the individual subjects of a group results in a novel (i.e., combined) 2 value. (It follows from the definition of the 2 distribution that the sum of independent 2 variables is also 2 distributed, meaning that the sum of individual 2 values will be a 2 value, too.) Then, significance (p value) at group level (i.e., deviations from chance) can be derived from this combined 2 value. It should be noted that Fisher's method uses a 2 statistic with two degrees of freedom (df) because only then is the relation Figure 1 . Symbol images of positive (Sϩ) and negative (SϪ) intact, scrambled, and blurred stimuli as well as of stimuli that were both blurred and scrambled, shown separately for the exemplar-based and the rule-based task. The pictures closely match some of the stimuli that were used in the present experiment, both regarding style and subject. (The pictures that were actually presented could not be included for copyright reasons.) See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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between 2 statistic and probability (p value) a mathematically simple one: 
Results
The order in which the two tasks were learned was found to be irrelevant for acquisition in both species, with Mann-Whitney U tests revealing no differences between subjects that learned the exemplar-based task first and subjects that learned the rule-based task first, regarding the numbers of sessions required to reach criterial level (all p Ն .05). Also, transfer performance was found to be independent from the order of tasks. Except in one single case, 2 Mann-Whitney U tests failed to reveal any significant differences in the numbers of correct choices on test trials in any of the four tests (all p Ն .05). Therefore, no distinction will, in the following, be made between exemplar-based first and rule-based first subjects. Figure 2 shows the numbers of sessions that were required by pigeons and humans to reach the learning criterion in the two different tasks. The values obtained for the individual subjects as well as the means (Ϯ SD) that are shown in Figure 2 can be found in the online supplemental materials Table S1 . Clearly, the pigeons of Group Blurred needed more training to reach criterion than the pigeons of Groups Intact and Scrambled. Mann-Whitney U tests confirmed that in both tasks the difference in the number of required sessions was significant between Groups Intact and Blurred (exemplar-based: p ϭ .002; rule-based: p ϭ .008) as well as between Groups Scrambled and Blurred (exemplar-based: p ϭ .004; rule-based: p ϭ .04), but there was no significant difference between Groups Intact and Scrambled in either task. In all three groups, the rule-based task was acquired more rapidly than the exemplar-based task, and this difference was significant for Groups Intact and Scrambled (Wilcoxon's tests: both p ϭ .031).
Training
The human participants learned faster than the pigeons. They needed significantly fewer sessions to reach criterial level in both tasks and all three presentation modes (Mann-Whitney U tests: exemplar-based: Group Intact: p ϭ .003, Group Scrambled: p ϭ .004, Group Blurred: p ϭ .004; rule-based: Group Intact: p ϭ .002, Group Scrambled: p ϭ .003; Group Blurred: p ϭ .002). Unlike the pigeons, humans showed no significant differences in learning speed between the three presentation modes, but they, too, acquired the rule-based task faster than the exemplar-based task, and this difference was significant in all three groups (Wilcoxon's tests: Group Intact: p ϭ .023; Group Scrambled: p ϭ .027: Group Blurred: p ϭ .026). Indeed, all subjects (except one of Group Scambled) reached criterial level within the minimum number of eight training sessions in the rule-based task. Table 1 gives a summary of the individual performances in all tests as numbers of subjects that responded correctly in more than half of the trials as well as numbers of subjects in which this tendency to respond correctly was significant. Table 2 gives the results of the group analyses (combined p values) that were assessed by using Fisher's method (see Data analysis) as well as effect sizes (best estimators for the correct choice probability of a group, and 95% confidence intervals). Details on the results of each individual as well as average performances of each group (means Ϯ SD) are provided in the online supplemental materials Table S2 .
Tests
Test 1: Transfer to other presentation modes. The results of Test 1 are illustrated in Figure 3 . Transfer (in the following indicated by "¡") was significant from intact to scrambled stimuli (Group Intact) and from scrambled to intact stimuli (Group Scrambled) in both tasks for most pigeons and also at group level. By contrast, pigeons' transfer from blurred stimuli to intact or scrambled stimuli (Group Blurred) as well as transfer from intact or scrambled stimuli to blurred ones (Groups Intact and Scrambled) was poor, with hardly any bird showing significant performance. Accordingly, transfer from and to blurred stimuli was not significant also at group level in most cases. 3 Better performance in the rule-than in the exemplar-based task was found only for transfer from intact to blurred stimuli (Wilcoxon's test; p ϭ .04). For all other transfers and also when all data were pooled (i.e., 36 values: 3 groups [Intact, Scrambled, Blurred] ϫ 6 subjects per group ϫ 2 transfer types per group), no advantage of either task (exemplar-or rule-based) was revealed.
The human participants showed excellent transfer between any two presentation modes in both tasks, with performances of all individuals being significant or even perfect. Accordingly, the results were highly significant also at group level for all transfers in both tasks. Better performance in the rule-based than in the 2 In Test 1 pigeons of Group Blurred that had accomplished the exemplar-based task before showed somewhat better transfer to the previously untrained presentation modes in the rule-based task than pigeons for which the rule-based task was the first one (p ϭ .03).
3 Only in the rule-based task, Groups Intact and Scrambled showed significant transfer to blurred stimuli. This reflects the tendency of most birds to respond correctly in slightly more than half of the trials, accumulating to significance at group level; however, it should be noted that transfer performance of two individuals of Group Intact and one individual of Group Scrambled only just reached significance (i.e., 15 correct first choices) and performance of all other birds was nonsignificant. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
exemplar-based task was found only for transfer from blurred to intact stimuli (Wilcoxon's-test; p ϭ .046) However, when analysis was carried out across all transfers (i.e., all 36 values of each task were pooled), a significant overall advantage of the rule-based task was found (p Ͻ .001). Throughout, humans' transfer performance was superior to that of pigeons, and this difference was significant for all transfers in both tasks (MannWhitney U tests: scr ¡ int: p ϭ .012 and blur ¡ scr: p ϭ .024 in the exemplar-based task; all other transfers: p Ͻ .01). Thus, not surprisingly, the difference between the two species was highly significant also when all data (i.e., 36 values) were pooled for each task (Mann-Whitney U tests; exemplar-based and rule-based task: both p Ͻ .001).
In brief, the most important finding to emerge from Test 1 was that, in both tasks, pigeons could generalize between intact and scrambled stimuli, whereas transfer from and to blurred stimuli was impaired. Humans readily transferred information between any two presentation modes.
Test 2: Transfer to grayscale stimuli. The results of Test 2 are illustrated in Figure 4 . In the exemplar-based task, pigeons' transfer to grayscale stimuli was generally poor, and was worst with blurred stimuli in Groups Intact and Scrambled. At group level, there was no significant transfer to grayscale stimuli in any group or for any presentation mode. In the rule-based task, occasional transfer was found for individual birds, however, performance was still bad overall. At group level, significant transfer was revealed only from colored intact and scrambled to grayscale intact and scrambled stimuli. Also, significant transfer occurred from colored blurred to grayscale blurred stimuli, but most other transfers that involved blurred stimuli were nonsignificant also at group level.
Performance was significantly better in the rule-than in the exemplar-based task only in Group Intact for transfer to blurred grayscale stimuli (Wilcoxon's test; int ¡ blur_g: p ϭ .046). However, when all 54 individual values that had been obtained in each task were pooled, a clear advantage of the rule-based taskalthough performance was still poor on an absolute scale-was revealed (p Ͻ .001).
In contrast to the pigeons, the human participants showed good transfer to grayscale stimuli in both tasks, all three groups, and for all kinds of transfer. Accordingly, also performance at group level was highly significant for all transfers. Wilcoxon's tests revealed that performance was significantly better in the rule-based task than in the exemplar-based task in Groups Intact and Scrambled for transfer to blurred grayscale stimuli (p ϭ .046) and in Group Blurred for transfer to scrambled grayscale stimuli (p ϭ .042). When all 54 individual values were pooled a highly significant advantage of the rule-based task was found (p Ͻ .001). Again, humans outperformed pigeons, and this difference was significant for all transfers, irrespective of task, group, and presentation mode (Mann-Whitney U tests; all p Ͻ .01). Consequently, the difference between the two species was highly significant also when all data (i.e., 54 values) were pooled for each task (Mann-Whitney U tests; exemplar-based and rule-based task: both p Ͻ .001).
In summary, Test 2 provided evidence of poor transfer to grayscale stimuli in pigeons, particularly when blurred stimuli were involved. By contrast, transfer to grayscale pictures was generally good in humans.
Test 3: Transfer to blurred ؉ scrambled stimuli. The results of Test 3 are illustrated in Figure 5 . In the pigeons, the effects of applying both operations (blurring and scrambling) affected performance more strongly in the rule-than in the exemplar-based task. In the exemplar-based task, more birds showed a (slight or even significant) tendency to respond correctly than in the rulebased task, and particularly the birds of Group Blurred coped well with this type of test stimuli in the exemplar-based task. At group level, transfer was significant for all three groups in the exemplarbased task, but only for Group Scrambled in the rule-based task. In Group Blurred the difference in performance between tasks was even significant (Wilcoxon's test; p ϭ .027). Also when all 18 Figure 2 . Number of training sessions required by pigeons and humans of the three groups (Intact, Scrambled, and Blurred) to achieve the criterion of mastery (significant performance in a binomial test in eight out of 10 successive sessions), shown separately for the exemplar-based and the rule-based task. Means (Ϯ SD) were taken across the six subjects of each group.
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individual values (3 groups ϫ 6 subjects) were pooled for each task, a significant advantage was revealed for the exemplar-based task (p ϭ .003). No such exemplar-superiority effect was found in the human participants, with almost all individually achieved values being significant. Consequently, also at group level transfer was highly significant, irrespective of task or group. Only Group Intact performed significantly better in the rule-than in the exemplar-based task (Wilcoxon's test; p ϭ .026), but when all 18 individually achieved values were pooled for each task, a significant advantage for the rule-based task was revealed (Wilcoxon's test; p ϭ .017).
In the exemplar-based task, humans outperformed pigeons only in Group Intact (Mann-Whitney U test; p ϭ .036), but in all three groups in the rule-based task (Group Intact: p ϭ .004; Group Scrambled: p ϭ .005; Group Blurred: p ϭ .005). When the 18 values achieved by the individual subjects were pooled for each task, humans' performance was superior to that of pigeons in both the exemplar-based (p ϭ .002) and the rule-based task (p Ͻ .001).
In brief, the most important finding to emerge from Test 3 was that the detrimental effects of simultaneously degrading local and global information affected pigeons' performance more strongly in the rule-based than in the exemplar-based task (particularly in Group Blurred). Performance of humans remained widely unaffected in both tasks.
Test 4: Transfer to novel stimuli. The results of Test 4 are illustrated in Figure 6 . Almost all pigeons of Groups Intact and Scrambled showed significant transfer to novel intact and scrambled stimuli. In both groups, however, most birds failed to generalize to the blurred versions of the novel stimuli. In turn, the majority of the subjects of Group Blurred failed to show significant transfer to novel intact and scrambled stimuli, but most could correctly classify novel blurred stimuli. At group level, performance of all groups was significant for all transfer conditions. 4 In humans, transfer performance was perfect in all groups and for all stimulus types (with the exception of one single incorrect choice). Thus, performance was highly significant also at group level. Once again, humans outperformed pigeons, and this difference was significant in all groups and for all transfer conditions (Mann-Whitney U tests; scr ¡ scr_n: p ϭ .039; all other transfers: p Ͻ .01).
In summary, Test 4 showed good generalization to novel stimuli in pigeons, however, with transfer between blurred stimuli and stimuli of the other two types (intact and scrambled) being limited. Humans showed excellent transfer from any type of familiar to any type of novel stimuli.
Discussion

Main Aspects
The present experiment was carried out to investigate comparatively with pigeons and humans whether exemplar-and rulebased visual categorization tasks would favor different processing styles (i.e., local or global) and whether transfer of information between processing levels would be possible. The main findings (for a summary list see Table S3 in the online supplemental materials) concerned the aspects of local versus global processing, exemplar-versus rule-based categorization, performance of pigeons versus performance of humans, and the role of color cues for categorization.
Local versus global. The fact that pigeons of Group Blurred needed considerably longer to learn the training tasks than did the subjects of Groups Intact and Scrambled as well as the finding that pigeons could, for the most part, transfer between intact and scrambled stimuli but had severe difficulties transferring from and to blurred stimuli support the claim of a "local precedence effect" in pigeons' visual learning, as was suggested, for example, also by the results of Cook et al. (1992) ; Cavoto and Cook (2001) , and Gibson et al. (2005) . In particular, the data point to the presence of a "transfer barrier" that impeded or even prevented transfer from and to blurred stimuli: Groups Intact and Scrambled showed poor transfer to blurred stimuli, and, in turn, Group Blurred showed poor transfer to intact and scrambled stimuli. Particularly the finding that Group Blurred could not recognize intact versions of their training stimuli is interesting because these, like the blurred Test 1: other modes int ¡ scr 6(4) 6 (6) 6 (6) 6 (6) int ¡ blur 6 (0) 6 (2) 6 (6) 6 (6) scr ¡ int 6 (5) 6 (4) 6 (6) 6 (6) scr ¡ blur 5 (0) 6 (1) 6 (6) 6 (6) blur ¡ int 4 (1) 4 (0) 6 (6) 6 (6) blur ¡ scr 3 (1) 4 (0) 6 (6) 6 (6) Test 2: grayscale int ¡ int_g 4 (1) 6 (3) 6 (6) 6 (6) int ¡ scr_g 4 (1) 6 (1) 6 (6) 6 (6) int ¡ blur_g 1 (0) 5 (0) 6 (6) 6 (6) scr ¡ int_g 5 (0) 6 (3) 6 (6) 6 (6) scr¡ scr_g 2 (0) 6 (3) 6 (6) 6 (6) scr ¡ blur_g 2 (0) 5 (0) 6 (6) 6 (6) blur ¡ int_g 2 (0) 4 (1) 6 (6) 6 (6) blur ¡ scr_g 4 (0) 4 (0) 6 (4) 6 (6) blur ¡ blur_g 2 (0) 4 (2) 6 (6) 6 (6) Test 3: blur ϩ scr int ¡ blur ϩ scr 6 (1) 5 (0) 6 (5) 6 (6) scr ¡ blur ϩ scr 6 (3) 4 (2) 6 (5) 6 (6) blur ¡ blur ϩ scr 6 (5) 4 (1) 6 (6) 6 (6) Test 4: novel stimuli int ¡ int_n 6 (6) 6 (6) int ¡ scr_n 6 (5) 6 (6) int ¡ blur_n 5 (2) 6 (6) scr ¡ int_n 6 (5) 6 (6) scr¡ scr_n 6 (6) 6 (6) scr ¡ blur_n 6 (2) 6 (6) blur ¡ int_n 6 (3) 6 (6) blur ¡ scr_n 6 (2) 6 (6) blur ¡ blur_n 5 (5) 6 (6)
Note. The results are given as numbers of subjects of 6 who responded correctly in more than half (i.e., Ͼ 10) of the test trials. Numbers of subjects who did so at a significant level (i.e., Ն 15; p ϭ .021) are given in parenthesis. Exemplar ϭ exemplar-based task; Rule ϭ rule-based task; int ϭ intact; scr ϭ scrambled; blur ϭ blurred; _g ϭ grayscale; blur ϩ scr ϭ both blurred and scrambled; _n ϭ novel instances of the training category (trees and nontrees); ¡ ϭ transfer.
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training stimuli, provided intact global information. This suggests that Group Blurred did not use global information at all but, like the other two groups, focused on local cues (or that global processing was, to some extent, present but only secondary to a prevalent processing of local cues). Local information was, however, degraded in blurred stimuli, which may have made acquisition of the training tasks difficult and severely impeded transfer to the other presentation modes in Group Blurred. In Groups Intact and Scrambled, by contrast, the use of local cues enabled transfer to the other mode (from intact to scrambled and from scrambled to intact stimuli). The finding that Group Intact could generalize to scrambled versions of their training stimuli shows that these cues were both position invariant and tiny enough to survive fragmentation. Critics may object that, alternatively, Groups Intact and Scrambled may have relied on more global cues that remained unaffected by scrambling, like overall brightness or color composition of individual stimuli. However, these cues were also present in the blurred versions. Thus, if the pigeons had used them, they This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
should have been able to transfer equally well also to blurred stimuli, but this was not the case. Finally, it is noteworthy that such a transfer barrier from and to blurred stimuli was present in both the exemplar-and the rule-based task. This shows that intact local information was essential for both memorizing individual stimuli and abstracting a perceptual rule. Taken together, the results provide evidence that the pigeons used local information even when it was degraded (and despite the fact that global information, which was intact, would have made a more obvious cue and a more reliable class predictor). Thus, the finding of Schwaninger et al. (2002a) that humans could readily generalize between scrambled and blurred stimuli could not be replicated for pigeons because of their refusal to use global information at all (or, at least, their preferred use of local information that overshadowed any global processing that may have been present as well). Whether the transfer barrier would fall (meaning that pigeons would show good transfer also from and to blurred stimuli) if only they could be forced to focus more on global cues, for example, by reducing stimulus size and/or increasing viewing distance, the present experiment did not reveal, but will be the subject of a future study. Unlike the pigeons, the human subjects learned equally fast and well with intact, scrambled, and blurred stimuli and showed excellent to perfect transfer in all tests, irrespective of presentation mode. This argues against any local or global preference-at least with the procedure and stimuli used in the present experiment. It may, for example, be objected that possible preferences for the one or the other processing style were overshadowed by the perceived overall simplicity of the tasks that allowed the human subjects to acquire them readily even when presented in a mode (e.g., scrambled) that they may, basically, have found more difficult to process than the other (e.g., blurred). This may indeed apply to the rule-based task which was acquired within the very first session by all but one subjects. In the exemplar-based task, however, performance improved gradually from chance level (like in the pigeons, although more rapidly). But even here we found no evidence of learning speed depending on group membership (i.e., the subjects of the three groups did not differ significantly in the number of training sessions they needed to reach criterion). So although interpretations in terms of lacking local or global preferences in the human subjects demand some caution regarding the rule-based task, quite a strong case can be made for the exemplar-based task.
By showing that the human subjects could transfer information between processing modes the present findings were in keeping with the results of Schwaninger et al. (2002a) and extended them by providing evidence that such transfer is restricted neither to priming paradigms nor to the domain of face recognition.
Exemplar-versus rule-based. The finding that both species showed faster learning in the rule-based than in the exemplarbased task supports the idea of a default abstractive stance, with the memorization of individual exemplars being secondary, as was suggested by Cook and Smith (2006) . The results of Test 4 (novel stimuli) confirmed that, indeed, the subjects did not just memorize the stimuli on a pixel-by-pixel basis but used a more abstract strategy. The finding that also test performance was, in most cases, better in the rule-than in the exemplar-based task showed that the presence of a perceptual rule facilitated not only learning but also transfer. However, the data did not provide any evidence that such a rule may favor the use of global information (e.g., about the overall Gestalt of a tree), whereas the necessity to learn every exemplar individually may favor the use of local information (e.g., item-specific shapes or colors)-neither in pigeons (which used local cues in both tasks) nor in humans (who showed no local or global preference in either task). This suggests that, in the present experiment, category structure was either completely irrelevant to the choice of processing mode or was overshadowed or outweighed by other factors.
It may, however, be argued that differences in picture style between the two tasks rather than the presence or the absence of a perceptual rule were responsible for faster learning and better transfer in the rule-based task. If the subjects found it generally easier to discriminate and recognize photographs than more abstract stimuli like comic figures, pieces of art, computer graphics, or color and texture patterns, irrespective of what the individual pictures showed, this could explain the advantage of the rule-over the exemplar-based task without any need to attribute this difference to category structure. To exclude this possibility, control groups of pigeons and humans were post hoc trained and tested with the intact, scrambled, and blurred tree and nontree pictures, however, in a pseudocategory task. This means that the pictures were arbitrarily assigned to the positive and the negative class so that no perceptual rule defined class membership. Instead, the stimuli had to be associated individually with the category to which they belonged. Both species needed longer to acquire the pseudocategory task than the rule-based and even the exemplar-based task. Transfer performances throughout testing mimicked those found for the exemplar-and rule-based task but were worse than in the latter two on an absolute scale. These findings argued against any general advantage of photographs over more abstract stimuli. If present at all, the effects of stimulus type on the ease with which the tasks were mastered must have been marginal relative to the effects of the presence (or absence) of a perceptual rule. In fact, faster learning in the rule-based than in the pseudocategory task lent further support to the assumption that the rule-based task was acquired more rapidly than the exemplarbased task (and the pseudocategory task) because it could be mastered by means of a strategy that was more economical than associating every single instance with the category to which it belonged, namely, by classifying the stimuli according to the presence or absence of a target ("tree").
Unlike in Tests 1 and 2, hardly any advantage of rule-based categorization was found in Test 3 (blurred ϩ scrambled stimuli) for either species, and, interestingly, the pigeons even showed somewhat better transfer in the exemplar-based task. Obviously, the added effects of both operations (blurring and scrambling) affected the recognition of the perceptual rule more strongly than that of the item-specific features learned in the exemplar-based task. We can only speculate on possible reasons for this. One explanation may result from the following characteristics of the presented stimuli: Although blurring plus scrambling degraded some local and global features in both tasks to an extent that severely impeded recognition, some features, particularly colorrelated ones (like individual colors or color compositions), remained unaltered. However, at least to the human eye, interstimulus similarities regarding color were much stronger in the ruleThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
based than in the exemplar-based task. 5 This means that color cues should have made more obvious (and reliable) class predictors in the exemplar-based than in the rule-based task. And, if so, the pigeons may have used such cues to classify the stimuli in the exemplar-based task of Test 3 and thereby somewhat compensated for the loss of information caused by blurring and scrambling (although only at a level that was still poor in absolute terms). In the rule-based task, this would, however, have been possible only to a much lesser extent if at all.
Pigeons versus humans. The human participants acquired the training tasks faster than the pigeons, and their transfer performance was superior to that of the pigeons in all tests (with some exceptions in Test 3). This showed the superiority of humans' categorization abilities, both regarding efficiency and flexibility. No transfer barrier between any two presentation modes was found in humans, and they could cope with modified and/or impoverished pictures much better than the pigeons, probably by redirecting their attention to other features that had remained unaffected. This difference in flexibility is in keeping with previous findings of pigeons sometimes tending to become blind to alternative solutions or being reluctant to switch to other cues if their preferred ones have been removed (e.g., Aust, Range, Steurer, & Huber, 2008; Huber et al., 2000) . In addition to flexible feature use the ease with which the human subjects acquired the training tasks and generalized to modified or novel stimuli during testing may have been related also to their ability to label the stimuli. This, on the one hand, constitutes a potential confound in all studies that compare a language-competent species with a nonlinguistic one. On the other hand, it is exactly that difference that adds an important aspect to such comparative experiments: Categorization does-at least at lower levels of abstraction (like the perceptual one)-not depend on language and the results of studies like the present one, in which the experimental set-up was almost identical for both species, nicely demonstrate that even a nonlinguistic animal like the pigeon can master some of the same categorization tasks as humans.
Color versus grayscale. Decrements in performance levels with grayscale relative to color stimuli in Test 2 (grayscale), which were evident for both tasks and almost all transfers, showed that color cues were important for transfer. But whereas humans could widely compensate for the loss of color information by drawing on other stimulus properties, maybe brightness or texture cues, the pigeons failed with grayscale stimuli. This confirms the results of previous studies that showed pigeons' strong dependence on color information in visual tasks (e.g., Aust & Huber, 2001 , 2010 Aust & Steurer, 2013; Huber et al., 2000; Loidolt et al., 2003; Kirsch et al., 2008; Troje et al., 1999; Wills et al., 2009 ). Nevertheless, it should be noted that also the pigeons could still use information about the presence or absence of the target even in the grayscale stimuli to somewhat improve their performance in the rule-based task relative to the exemplar-based task (though at a poor absolute level).
Evaluation of Our Hypotheses and Predictions
Returning to the predictions and hypotheses put forward in the introduction, the results of the present experiment thus allow for the following conclusions:
1. The hypothesis that the rule-based task should be learned faster than the exemplar-based task and that this was attributable to a more economical strategy (abstraction of a rule instead of rote learning) was confirmed by the data.
2. A local bias was indeed found for the pigeons, with Group Blurred learning more slowly than the other two groups. However, the data did not support a global bias in humans, as all groups learned with similar ease.
3. The hypothesis that rule-based tasks should promote global processing and exemplar-based tasks should promote local processing could not be verified for either species.
4. The human data showed that the findings by Schwaninger et al. (2002a) are not restricted to priming paradigms and human face stimuli but are replicable also with other procedures and different stimulus classes. In pigeons, however, hardly any transfer of information between the local and the global level was found, which was attributed to their refusal to use global information and a transfer barrier from and to blurred stimuli.
5. Generally poor performance with grayscale stimuli in pigeons (together with their overall local bias) and generally good performance with these stimuli in humans makes any reasonable conclusions on whether one processing level (local or global) may have been more dependent on color information impossible. Regarding the hypothesis that color may be more important in exemplar-based tasks the finding that transfer to grayscale stimuli was better (in humans) or at least less bad (in pigeons) in the rule-based than in the exemplar-based task may be taken as some indication that this was indeed the case. But here, too, the generally high (humans) or low (pigeons) performance levels, together with the fact that learning and transfer were superior in the rule-based task not only in Test 2 but in almost all phases of the experiment, warrant caution.
6. The finding that simultaneously blurring and scrambling the stimuli led to performance decrements (particularly in pigeons in the rule-based task) but did not completely disrupt recognition confirmed, on the one hand, the suitability of these operations in removing local and global information but, on the other hand, also showed that these pictures still contained remnants of local and global information to an extent that was sufficient to allow for categorization in the exemplar-based task in pigeons and in both tasks in humans.
Conclusions
The results of the present experiment support the notion of a local precedence in pigeons and suggest the presence of a transfer barrier from and to stimuli with degraded local information (blurred). By contrast, humans showed no preference for either processing level. There was no evidence in either species for the use of local or global cues depending on category structure (exemplar-or rule-based). Thus, preference for the one or the other processing mode in such tasks is obviously attributable to other factors with some likely candidates being viewing distance and/or stimulus size, availability of local/global features, and salience of individual stimulus properties. Actually, color was found to be an 5 The two tasks also seemed to differ in other respects, like textural cues and variability in the depicted shapes ("Gestalten"), but as the influence of such features was not tested, they are neglected in the present discussion. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
important cue, particularly for the pigeons. For the human participants, the finding of Schwaninger et al. (2002a) that transfer of information between the local and the global level of processing is possible was confirmed and extended by the present data, but it could not be evaluated for the pigeons because of their strong local bias.
